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Stable Summit

Stablecoins impact on banks' liquidity - Charles-Enguerrand Coste

Charles-Enguerrand Coste

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Key takeaways

  • Liquidity Squeeze: Deposits from stablecoin issuers are classified as 100 percent flight-risk “financial-sector deposits,” forcing banks to hold an equal amount of high-quality liquid assets and limiting their ability to fund loans.
  • Capital Paradox: Replacing risky loans with treasuries boosts a bank’s risk-weighted capital ratio, so issuing or onboarding stablecoins can look attractive to banks with weaker credit books—even while hurting liquidity ratios.
  • Disintermediation Risk: When retail money migrates to non-bank stablecoins that invest mainly in treasuries, bank balance-sheet size and lending capacity shrink, echoing concerns raised after the SVB episode.
  • Regulatory Divergence: The European Central Bank mandates at least 30 percent of reserves as bank deposits; Japan recently cut a 100 percent rule to 50 percent, while proposed U.S. rules are far looser. These choices sharply alter bank impacts.
  • Collateral Allocation Puzzle: Higher mandatory bank-deposit shares support bank funding but increase systemic exposure to rapid redemptions; lower shares reduce that exposure yet accelerate disintermediation.
  • Policy Trade-off: Treating stablecoin liabilities as fully flight-risk assets may be overly blunt once mass retail adoption lowers volatility, but loosening rules without stronger bank liquidity practices could recreate SVB-style stress.

On Liquidity Classification and Requirements

Charles-Enguerrand Coste explains that banking regulators bucket liabilities by expected outflow speed. Retail deposits incur a 5 percent liquidity charge, corporates up to 40 percent, and financial-sector deposits—including stablecoin reserves—100 percent. This means every euro taken from a stablecoin issuer must be matched by a euro of treasuries or central-bank cash. Consequently, banks cannot recycle that funding into traditional lending, compressing net interest margins and weakening liquidity coverage ratios.

On Capital Efficiency and Profitability

Although liquidity tightens, capital ratios often improve, because high-quality liquid assets carry minuscule risk weights. A bank with a risky loan book can issue or attract stablecoin funding, park it in treasuries, and dilute the share of high-risk assets. Conversely, a conservative lender sees little capital benefit but still bears the liquidity cost, making the trade-off unattractive.

On Bank-issued versus Non-bank Stablecoins

If a bank converts its own deposits into bank-issued stablecoins, the liabilities instantly reclassify from low-risk retail to 100 percent flight-risk unless the holder is known, eroding liquidity. When the stablecoin is issued by a non-bank such as Circle, the picture is identical for the hosting bank if all reserves stay on-balance-sheet. The dynamic changes only when the issuer invests most reserves directly in treasuries, at which point the bank loses both funding and fee income.

On Regulatory Architecture Choices

The European Central Bank’s 30 percent bank-deposit floor aims to balance bank funding with redemption safety. Japan’s pivot from 100 to 50 percent signals concern that high floors choke lending. By contrast, draft U.S. rules allow almost full treasury backing, effectively encouraging disintermediation. Policymakers therefore face a three-way optimisation problem: bank stability, credit creation, and stablecoin utility.

Key actionable insights

  • Monitor stablecoin reserve mix disclosures; shifts from deposits to treasuries will directly influence euro-area loan growth.
  • Track supervisory guidance on “known holder” exemptions, as clearer rules could revive interest in bank-issued stablecoins.
  • Watch for coordinated revisions to liquidity coverage calibrations; any softening would signal regulators’ willingness to trade liquidity risk for credit-supply preservation.