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Science of Blockchain Conference 2026

Timing Games in Responsive Consensus Protocols

Session summary

The presenter studies how miner/validator extractable value (MEV) creates timing games in responsive Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus. In their model, leaders gain a fixed block reward plus MEV that grows with waiting, but utility is measured as reward per unit time. With static rewards, each validator is tempted to delay for extra MEV, yet collective delay slows the chain and leaves everyone worse off, giving a prisoner’s‑dilemma structure to participation. To mitigate this, the authors propose a protocol that measures proposal timeliness and applies a time‑decaying block reward.

Because the protocol has no trusted clocks, each validator locally times how long the leader took, then submits a “timeliness vote.” These reports are aggregated, using for example the m‑th smallest value, to estimate delay. The authors prove that with an appropriate choice of m, the selected vote comes from a quorum participant and remains a function of the true delay. If the block reward decays quickly enough so that expected MEV plus reward falls over time, immediate proposing and honest voting form a subgame‑perfect equilibrium. They also analyze coalitions and fairness, finding coalitions tend to be unstable and that the mechanism introduces a small fairness cost in their models and simulations.

Key takeaways

  • The authors model MEV-driven timing games in responsive BFT and argue that static block rewards with delay-sensitive MEV create a prisoner’s‑dilemma incentive to delay, reducing overall chain speed and utility.
  • They introduce a timeliness voting mechanism where validators locally measure leader delay, aggregate reports via an order statistic such as the m‑th smallest, and assign a time‑decaying block reward based on this score.
  • Their analysis shows that, under suitable decay parameters and network assumptions, immediate proposing and honest voting are an equilibrium, coalitions are limited or unstable, and the design imposes a modest fairness cost in stylized and simulated topologies.