Forget-IT: Optimal Good-Case Latency For Information-Theoretic BFT
Session summary
The presenter introduces Forget-IT, a Byzantine agreement protocol that targets optimal good-case latency in an information-theoretic (unauthenticated) setting. They first recap leader-based consensus under partial synchrony and explain why three rounds is a known lower bound for good-case Byzantine broadcast when cryptographic authentication is available. In that authenticated world, their warm-up construction uses a dissemination phase followed by two voting rounds and a black-box Byzantine agreement with strong unanimity to ensure safety and termination, while deciding in three rounds when the sender is correct and the network is synchronous from the start.
The core contribution concerns removing cryptography while preserving this good-case behavior. The authors adapt the same fast-path plus fallback structure, but can no longer justify votes with signatures. Their key idea is to wait for a “clean” quorum of vote-two messages—where all non-bottom votes in the set agree—before adopting a value for the fallback agreement. Using quorum-intersection arguments, they argue this adoption rule is both safe and live, and integrate it into a leader-based, view-by-view protocol with quadratic messages per view and bounded view duration.
Key takeaways
- The authors design an information-theoretic BFT protocol that attains optimal three-round good-case latency without relying on cryptographic authentication.
- A central technique is the use of a “clean” quorum of vote-two messages to safely adopt values in the unauthenticated setting before invoking a strong-unanimity Byzantine agreement fallback.
- The final protocol is leader-based with quadratic message complexity per view and is engineered to keep view durations and persistent storage bounded while preserving safety and liveness.