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Debate How Should Protocols Monetize Blockspace | PMLS 2025 | Day 2 | Blockchain Design

Andy , Tarun Chitra, Joshua Tobkin, Jon Charbonneau, Max Resnick

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Key takeaways

  • Venture-style Monetization: Jon Charbonneau and Tarun Chitra frame early blockspace subsidies as venture debt—at launch you give it away to seed network effects, but you must embed a credible path to flip on sustainable fees or token value eventually collapses.
  • Fee “Laffer Curve”: Max Resnick models validator revenue as a parabola; charge too little and the chain starves, charge too much and apps churn. The strategic task is locating the revenue-maximizing midpoint, then revisiting it as scale and substitutes evolve.
  • Margin Compression Inevitable: All speakers agree that the long-run take rate extracted by general-purpose chains will shrink sharply; most value will accrue to successful applications, not to the base layer or sequencers.
  • L1-L2 Power Balance: Tarun Chitra argues Ethereum’s current pricing leaves roll-ups as the profit-taking agents while Ethereum supplies capital as principal—an unstable equilibrium that will push either higher DA pricing or L2s exiting to their own L1s.
  • MEV Redistribution, Not Eradication: Joshua Tobkin advocates treating liquidation and arbitrage flows as “system-level automation,” captured on-chain then rebated to dApps and validators; Max Resnick wants deterministic, app-defined ordering rules inside Solana to cut today’s implicit MEV tax.
  • Deterministic Ordering over FCFS: First-come-first-served works only for centralized sequencers. For decentralized systems, speakers favor rule-based ordering—priority-fee sorting, randomized VRF ordering, or MCP sub-block merges—to keep latency low and proofs simple.
  • Scale over Price: Revenue targets such as “one million TPS at 0.2 cents” (Resnick) require orders-of-magnitude more usage than today; until that demand exists, attempts to raise prices—whether “tax the L2s” or high Solana priority fees—risk driving activity elsewhere.

On Monetizing Blockspace

Jon Charbonneau opens with the startup analogy: treat blockspace like a freemium public good while cultivating developer mindshare, but build toward validator profitability or the network will not persist. Tarun Chitra extends the thought, calling unused blockspace a form of venture debt whose interest is paid later through fee capture; without credible fee-switch mechanics, early token investors remain stranded. Max Resnick counters that chains should aim for near-zero base fees and invoke pricing only to deter spam or push back against capacity limits, complementing that with optional priority fees. The shared conclusion is that profitability is necessary yet must arrive only after real economic throughput exists.

On Fee Models, MEV and Application Flight

The panel’s sharpest debate centers on how much of an app’s economics the chain can harvest. Resnick warns that Solana’s blend of base fees, Jito tips and validator-side MEV is already discomforting large dApps; if the effective rake nears “Apple-style 30 percent,” projects like Pump.fun will fork their own chains. He proposes letting programs delay or fail transactions based on priority price so dApps, not validators, shape ordering. Joshua Tobkin describes Supra’s alternative: oracle updates, automation and flash-loan-funded liquidations run as protocol services at block end, with captured value algorithmically rebated to dApps, node operators and a treasury for buybacks—turning toxic MEV into transparent revenue sharing.

On L1–L2 Pricing and the “Tax the Roll-ups” Question

Andy prompts discussion of whether Ethereum should raise data-blob prices. Charbonneau argues it lacks pricing power today; with blobs far below saturation, raising rates would merely push roll-ups to Celestia-style DA. Chitra reframes the debate through principal-agent theory: when L2s own the cash flow and Ethereum holds the capital stake, the agent is overpaid; equilibrium requires either a higher DA tariff or the L2s migrating off. The Optimism–Base deal, where Base pays ten percent of revenue to Optimism rather than Ethereum, demonstrates how capture can be displaced rather than eliminated.

On Ordering Rules and Determinism

Because nodes receive messages at variable latency, first-come-first-served cannot be proven in a decentralized network. Tobkin outlines Supra’s coming VRF-based random ordering to blunt frontrunning. Resnick details Solana’s roadmap: multiple leaders build sub-blocks; a merger layer orders by “priority fee per compute unit”; programs observe that order and can censor or delay internal actions to protect user value. Charbonneau predicts L2s and L1s will converge on similar deterministic schemes, since users care only about execution quality, not nomenclature.

On Long-Term Fee Trajectories

All panelists expect average per-transaction fees to asymptotically approach, but not reach, zero. The sustaining revenues will come from scale—hundreds of thousands of TPS—and selectively high priority surcharges. Resnick’s arithmetic shows that at one million TPS and $0.002 per call, a chain grosses roughly $60 billion annually, but getting there demands many-fold industry growth. Until then, any attempt to pad margins through higher base fees or heavy MEV extraction risks accelerating the competitive search for cheaper blockspace.

Key actionable insights

  • Monitor new deterministic ordering mechanisms; successful deployment could reset competitive benchmarks for MEV leakage and dApp margins.
  • Track DA pricing and usage metrics—especially Ethereum blob fill rates—to gauge when base layers might gain leverage to lift tariffs.
  • Watch for evidence of flagship Solana dApps experimenting with app-chains or roll-ups; such moves signal that validator take rates remain too high.