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Digital Asset Summit New York 2026

Bitcoin In a World With Quantum Computers | DAS NYC 2026 | Day 1 | Bitcoin

Matt Corallo

Session summary

Matt Corallo argues that a “cryptographically relevant quantum computer” (CRQC) would threaten Bitcoin’s current signature scheme by allowing attackers to derive private keys from public keys revealed on‑chain, enabling theft even from correctly managed wallets. He stresses that existing quantum computers have not yet performed the generic factoring needed for such attacks and cites researchers and government agencies as expecting a roughly decade‑scale timeline for a CRQC, though he believes preparation must start now due to Bitcoin’s slow upgrade process. Corallo says current post‑quantum signature schemes are larger, slower, and less feature‑rich than what Bitcoin wallets typically use, so the first step is adding a quantum‑secure fallback that imposes no extra cost until needed.

According to Corallo, Taproot was designed to support hidden secondary public key commitments, and recent work by Tim Ruffing provides a proof that this fallback construction can be made quantum secure. He expects optional PQC validation opcodes, followed by slow wallet adoption, potentially accelerated as Q‑day becomes clearer. Corallo further claims that seed phrases remain quantum secure and could anchor expensive zero‑knowledge proofs for users who fail to migrate before a CRQC exists. He predicts that, if markets have clear visibility into CRQC timelines, investors will favor a fork that freezes quantum‑vulnerable coins on a fixed date while preserving claim paths for seed‑based wallets, rather than accepting a sudden sale of large, historically dormant balances.

Key takeaways

  • Corallo defines a cryptographically relevant quantum computer as one that can derive a private key from a public key appearing in a Bitcoin transaction, allowing funds to be stolen even when users have not leaked their keys.
  • He maintains that current quantum computers have not yet factored numbers with a generic algorithm and says researchers and agencies still frame post‑quantum migration as a decade‑scale concern, but he argues Bitcoin must begin transitioning early because protocol and wallet upgrades are slow.
  • Corallo claims Taproot’s hidden secondary public key commitments can support a quantum‑secure fallback, and that seed phrases remain quantum secure and could underpin costly zero‑knowledge proofs to recover funds after Q‑day; he expects markets, via forked‑coin trading, to choose freezing insecure coins over allowing a large influx of stolen dormant coins onto the market.