Cooperative General Intelligence
Matt Liston
Session summary
The presenter describes “cooperative general intelligence” as systems built from software agents plus enforceable commitments, usually implemented in trusted execution environments that do not leak data. He highlights three primitives: agents that can provably forget information if they decline to purchase it, agents that perform bounded information extraction over private data (such as outputting only a score), and “superset state” agents that can inspect other agents or transaction graphs without revealing underlying state. These ingredients, he argues, can support markets for sensitive data, private evaluations, information dark pools, hiring dark pools based on rich but hidden profiles, and routing through private reputation or transaction graphs.
He suggests that such mechanisms might blur the line between markets, which aggregate dispersed information into prices, and firms, which operate on private information but are inflexible. The talk also connects these tools to the use of “negative information,” such as unpublished failures in research or medicine, allowing processes to benefit from these data without full disclosure. The presenter emphasizes that commitment enforcement is an ongoing “cat and mouse game” and divides it into simple TEE-attestable guarantees, deterministic output‑gating, and a harder class that may require competitive monitoring agents plus occasional escalation to external judges.
Key takeaways
- The presenter’s framework relies on agents plus commitments in trusted execution environments, with additional monitoring because TEEs alone cannot guarantee complex behaviors.
- He proposes three primitives—forgetting/conditional recall, bounded information extraction, and superset‑state inspection—that enable private information markets, dark pools, and richer hiring and routing mechanisms.
- He argues these tools could create new institutional forms between markets and firms and make better use of dispersed and negative information, but notes that enforcing commitments remains technically difficult and often requires competitive oversight.