Key Takeaways
- Crypto has lost almost $800M in 2026, including this week's $290M Kelp rsETH exploit.
- A forged crosschain message released 116,500 rsETH with no matching source-chain burn.
- Kelp's 1-of-1 security setup, not LayerZero, let the release through.
- Kelp paused rsETH contracts about 46 minutes after the hit, blocking two follow-up attempts of 40,000 rsETH each.
- Aave carried over $200M of borrowed ETH/WETH against impaired collateral at the time of the hack.
It’s one wake-up call after another, totaling almost $800M lost in 2026 already after this week’s Kelp $290M rsETH exploit. AI is the invisible hand behind the scenes, shedding light on careless and sloppy human practices. Those same practices sit underneath code securing millions in unprotected capital deployed onchain. Exploiting code has always been easier than hardening it. AI has made it effortless to push unvetted code as developers themselves take shortcuts, and the offense still has the edge over defense. That’s forcing a lot of investors to ask whether having money onchain is still worth the structural risk.

AI is the quiet presence in the room that everyone feels but few name. It tilts the odds without demanding attention. The underlying capabilities have been around since at least GPT‑5 (Summer 2025) and Opus 4.5 (November 2025); what’s changed is that they’re now being actively weaponized. On top of that, everyone has access to far more powerful models now.

Kelp’s rsETH exploit underscored again that DeFi isn’t a set of isolated protocols, but a chain of dependencies where composability cuts both ways: stress in one corner can cascade everywhere. Things get more fragile once you add liquid staking, with the same LSTs threaded through multiple lending venues. It gets even uglier when a 1:1 multisig is responsible for managing a seemingly “risk-free” asset (as in “backed by ETH, earning Ethereum’s staking rate”) across chains.

Indeed, the root cause of the exploit wasn’t staking, restaking, lending, or crosschain risk (Aave, Eigen, or LayerZero can’t be blamed). The issue was a forged crosschain message where a 1-of-1 security setup trusted the release of 116,500 rsETH without a matching source-chain burn. One side said “release”; the other side never actually paid. This wasn’t LayerZero’s fault, but rather an improper DVN setup, which is Kelp’s responsibility (since it’s their own security stack; LayerZero remains an immutable, permissionless, censorship-resistant protocol).

The attacker funded their wallet through Tornado Cash roughly 10 hours before the hit, and Kelp paused rsETH contracts roughly 46 minutes later, which blocked two follow-up attempts of 40,000 rsETH each. Good emergency response, but too late for the first hole. Nobody wants to be left without a chair when the music stops. ETH’s price appreciation could make things worse when it comes to estimating bad debt across lending markets, of which Aave carried over $200M of borrowed ETH/WETH against impaired collateral at the time of the hack.
Conclusion
The exploit was not a failure of staking, restaking, lending, or crosschain design. A single 1-of-1 setup trusted a forged message, and 116,500 rsETH left without a burn on the other side. Composability holds the system together and spreads the damage. Kelp's pause came 46 minutes late, and two follow-up attempts of 40,000 rsETH each were stopped. The risk sits in shared collateral and thin security stacks. Watch Aave's $200M of borrowed ETH/WETH against impaired collateral, and whether teams replace 1-of-1 setups.


